Taxation of Barbers.—For violating the statute providing that barbers shall be licensed and registered before being allowed to engage in tonsorial toil, appellant in Jackson *v.* State, 117 Southwestern Reporter, 818, was convicted. The law exempts students in the state university and barbers in small towns. Its purpose is to insure efficiency in the barbers and hygienic conditions in their establishments. The statute was declared unconstitutional by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on the ground that it was contrary to the provision prohibiting taxation of mechanical employments, and that by its exceptions it became discriminatory because the evils intended to be prevented could as easily arise in an institution of learning or a hamlet as in the frescoed parlors of a metropolis.

Person Setting Up Estoppel Must Be Prejudiced Thereby.—One insured in a beneficiary association indicated his purpose to absent himself from his family for a few days, but from that time nothing was heard of him. For two years following his absence the premiums were paid by his wife. Thereafter an opportunity presented itself to the wife to dispose of her real property for which purpose she secured a divorce that she might convey a good title to the realty. Seven years after the husband's disappearance she instituted an action for the insurance. The association insisted that by bringing the action for divorce she had expressed her belief that her husband lived, and that after she had ceased payments on his certificate she was estopped to assert that he was dead. In Butler *v.* Supreme Court I. O. F., 101 Pacific Reporter, 481, the Washington Supreme Court decided that the wife was not estopped to assert her husband's death within the two years following his disappearance, as the association could not have been injured by reason of her conduct.

Tendency of Registration to Disfranchise.—The Illinois law made registration a prerequisite to voting. There was an opportunity allowed to register for the August election in April. No person who would not be 21 on the day of the election following his registration was allowed to register, but those persons moving into a precinct subsequent to the registration day were allowed to vote. The law was attacked in People *v.* Strassheim, 88 Northeastern Reporter, 821, on the grounds that it was invalid because violating the constitutional provision that elections shall be free and equal, and that it tended to disfranchise electors. Thus a man becoming 21 between April and August would not be entitled to vote. He might become 21 within a day after the April election and possess all the qualifications of a voter, but the law, affording him no opportunity to register, deprived him of the right to vote in August. Those securing citizenship through naturalization between the months mentioned would be in a like predicament. The Illinois Supreme Court, adopting both objec-

tions to the law, held that its effect was violative of the Constitution, in that it disfranchised voters who through no fault of their own, but because the law offered them no opportunity, were unable to register.

Power to Regulate Advertising.—New York City passed an ordinance regulating the use of streets for the exhibits of advertising, providing that no advertising wagons be allowed therein except ordinary business notices on wagons not used merely for advertising. The power to pass this ordinance was questioned in Fifth Ave. Coach Company *v.* City of New York, 86 Northeastern Reporter, 824. It appeared that the compensation which the Coach Company derived by advertising was regulated by the number of coaches which it employed. This number constantly increased. By the advertising display alone was realized a gross income of more than 6 per cent. on the entire capital stock. Slow moving trucks were barred from the streets owing to the congestion attending the passing of these garish vehicles. The New York Court of Appeals decided the ordinance within the city's power to pass, remarking that every procession, parade, or show upon vehicles passing through the public streets tends to congestion therein, and to some extent interferes with those engaged in business. If the company have the right to so decorate its conveyances, the owner of any wagon would have the same right, such a panorama of urban art being capable of assuming the aspect of a congestive menace.

Obstructing Sidewalks by Fruit Merchants.—Its sidewalks being occupied by shiners of shoes and venders of fruit, a city passed an ordinance making it unlawful for any person to erect any booth, shed, stand, or any other obstruction upon the sidewalk for the sale of merchandise, or to be used for shining shoes. By those newly acquired citizens whom this regulation affected, it was bitterly assailed in Chapman *v.* City of Lincoln, 121 Northwestern Reporter, 596. Plaintiffs complained that other merchants were allowed to use the sidewalks for the display of their goods. The Nebraska Supreme Court held the city without authority to bind the public whose free right to the streets and sidewalks could not be taken. Because it, perhaps illegally, has seen fit to allow its merchants to display upon the walls in front of their stores samples of their wares, it does not follow that it was ever the intention of the city to allow such merchants to convert the sidewalk space set apart for the public into a source of revenue by subletting to obnoxious persons who use it for crying out, engaging their services, and selling their wares.

Denial of Equal Protection of Convicts.—Prisoners in Idaho, attempting an escape, were punishable by confinement for the term of their original sentence. If a convict were serving a one-year